REMARKS

Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of the present application in view of the foregoing amendments and in view of the reasons that follow.

Status of Claims:

No claims are currently being added or cancelled.

Claims 1, 11, 21 and 22 are currently being amended.

This amendment and reply amends claims in this application. A detailed listing of all claims that are, or were, in the application, irrespective of whether the claims remain under examination in the application, is presented, with an appropriate defined status identifier.

After amending the claims as set forth above, claims 1-24 are pending in this application.

Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd Paragraph:

In the Office Action, claims 1, 11, 21 and 22 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd Paragraph, as being indefinite, because "It's unclear to the examiner how the alias is automatically displayed by the browser without the user input? After the user selected and actuate the link?" In reply, the intent of the allegedly indefinite phrase in claims 1, 11, 21 and 22 was that the actual providing of the alias on the display by the browser is done without the user doing anything to cause the transformation of one URL to another ("alias") URL. Of course the user's actuation of an icon on a web page causes the browser to go to another web page, whereby an alias of that sub-page is displayed, but the creation of the alias address of the other web page from a "real address" is what is done without user interaction.

In the interest of expediting prosecution, however, claims 1, 11, 21 and 22 have been amended to modify the allegedly indefinite phrase to recite "wherein the alias is displayed by the browser", whereby all of the presently pending claims fully comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd Paragraph.

Objection to Claim 10:

In the Office Action, claim 10 was objected to because "the phrase 'greatest' renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear whether the limitation(s) following the phrase are part of the claimed invention." Applicant respectfully disagrees with this objection. Namely,

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the word "greatest" is used to define the claimed "predetermined criterion", whereby the predetermined criterion is the greatest progress in establishing full connection with one of the servers after a specified interval of time following simultaneous actuation of all links. For example, assume that three links are simultaneously actuated, Link 1, Link 2, and Link 3. Now, after 10 seconds, which would in this example correspond to the specified interval of time following the time when the three links were simultaneously actuated, Link 1 is 50% progressed to full connection status, Link 2 is 30% progressed to full connection status, and Link 3 is 40% progressed to full connection status. Thus, in this example, Link 1 is the link that has the greatest progress (e.g., 50% > 40% > 30%) in establishing full connection with one of the servers after a specified interval of time following simultaneous actuation of all links.

As the features recited in claim 10 are clear to one skilled in the art, based on a reading of the specification, it is respectfully submitted that claim 10 is unobjectionable.

Claim Rejections – Prior Art:

In the Office Action, claims 1-24 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,751,777 to Bates in view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0028599 to Kolsky. This rejection is traversed for at least the reasons given below.

In the present invetion, an alias of a URL is displayed by a client's browser to show the identity, so to speak, of a page a user is trying to get to. In some instances, this ends up being a different URL to the one the user was intending to get to. An example of this might be if one was to type in http://www.yahoo.co.uk, and end up at http://uk.yahoo.com/ - which is not the URL the user asked for, strictly speaking. In the present invention, users are diverted to a different URL just as yahoo might do as described above; and so, overall, users get served their pages quicker. The difference with the yahoo example above and the present invention is that the present invention is provided so as not to allow the users to SEE the different URL that the user is actually taken to, because that might allow the user to try to get to that URL in the future rather than a possibly different one the web operators may want them to go to, thus possibly interfering with load balancing. So, in the present invention, by analogy to the yahoo example given above, although the user might be sent to a second URL (http://uk.yahoo.com/), the browser would continue to display the first URL (http://www.yahoo.co.uk), and the user would never know the difference (and that he/she has

been diverted). Thus, the alias that is being displayed at the browser in the present invention is not related at all to a bookmark, such as described by Bates, but the "alias" according to the present invention is directed to the address that the user has been directed to (whereas a bookmark is an alias of the address that the user is intending to get to).

Turning now to the specific features recited in the presently pending claims, claim 1 recites a step of sending to a client a copy of a page that contains a link to a sub-page, and claim 1 also recites a step of actuating the link to the sub page. Bates et al. is directed to actuation of bookmarks in conjunction with multi-target links, whereby the bookmarks are described as 'aliases' for the actual targets of the links. Thus, in Bates et al., the link that is on the page sent to the client is not the link that is actuated; rather, it is some other link. Accordingly, Bates et al. does not teach or suggest "actuating **the** link" (whereby the link in question is the one that was sent to the client with a copy of a first web page).

Turning now to the secondary reference, Kolsky, that reference refers to 'aliases', but in the context of introduction of another layer in a network protocol stack, that being an aliasing layer. The aliasing layer is provided between the application layer and the user. See paragraph 0042 of Kolsky. The purpose of the aliasing layer is to overcome the problem of a user's identity being mapped to the application layer of the networking protocol, with the result that, if a user is not using a particular application, then no connection is possible with the user. See paragraph 0008 of Kolsky. Kolsky overcomes this problem by inserting an aliasing layer (implemented via an alias switch) between the user and the application layer, whereby the aliasing layer simply provides a layer of indirection.

As is clear from the above description of Kolsky, Kolsky has nothing at all to do with web pages served to a client and displaying an alias of an address of a web page which is to serve the client; rather, Kolsky is directed to aliasing in general, and has no particular relevance to the claimed invention.

Furthermore, it is unclear how the teachings of Kolsky, which are directed to an additional aliasing protocol layer, can be combined with the teachings of Bates, which are directed to bookmarks for a user's favorite web pages.

It is noted that the Office Action asserts that paragraph 0051 of Kolsky for allegedly teaching certain features of claim 1, but this assertion is incorrect. Namely, paragraph 0051 of Kolsky merely describes that in the case of a web address, the alias switch can open an

HTTP connection with entity B's HTTP server and act as an HTTP proxy towards entity A or it may send entity A's web browser a redirect message with the URL that the alias id was resolved to. In other words, this paragraph of Kolsky describes that the alias switch operating on behalf of entity A can do one of two things. Either it can connect with entity B's HTTP server, whereby it will effectively be behaving as a proxy for entity A, or it can return to entity A a 'redirect' message containing the URL that the alias identity of entity B actually resolves to. In the first case, Kolsky's alias switch is not displaying anything, and in the second case, Kolsky's alias switch is not displaying the actual URL that the alias identity of entity B resolves to.

Thus, in either the first case or the second case of Kolsky as described in paragraph 0051 of that reference, an alias of an address of a web page which is to serve the client is not displayed by a browser, and thus Kolsky does not teach or suggest these features recited in each of the presently pending independent claims. Since Bates does not teach or suggest these features, as acknowledged in the Office Action due to the addition of Kolsky in the rejection of each of the independent claims, each of the independent claims is patentable over the combined teachings of Bates and Kolsky.

Note also that each of the presently pending independent claims has been amended to recite that the alias is an address of a web page which is served to the client, whereby the alias is an address of a web page sent in response to a request for a web page made by the client. Clearly, Bates does not do that in his alias bookmarking scheme, since no request for a web page has as yet been made by a client at the time when the alias bookmarks are provided on the user's display.

Therefore, for the reasons given above, independent claims 1, 11, 21 and 22 are patentable over the combined teachings of Bates and Kolsky.

Still further, with respect to dependent claim 3, that claim recites that the alias is an address of a server which is adapted to translate the alias into an address of a server on which a copy of the sub-page is hosted. In its rejection of claim 3, the Office Action asserts that column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates teaches these features. Applicants respectfully disagree. Namely, column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates describes multi-target links to navigate to one or more of a plurality of available 'targets' in response to input received from a user, whereby each target is typically identified by its storage location (e.g., URL), filename, path, and/or

other manner of addressing a document in a computer system. As further described in column 7, lines 36-45 of Bates, multi-target links identify a plurality of URLs representing the targets thereof, with at least some of the documents stored at the URLs being formatted using HTML protocol.

The above-described portions of Bates are not related at all to an alias corresponding to an address of a server which is adapted to translate the alias into an address of a server in which a copy of a sub-page is hosted. Rather, Bates provides for multiple targets to be selected based on a single input by a user, in which no "alias" that corresponds to "an address of a server in which a copy of a sub-page is hosted" is taught or suggested by Bates.

In the Response to Arguments section provided on page 17 of the Office Action, it asserts that column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates "discloses that the method of navigate to one or more of a plurality of available targets which identified by its storage location URL or filename, path or other manners of addressing a document", and that "Bates discloses that the method of displaying the alias name for the particular link other than the address of the server".

In reply, the generalized comments made in column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates regarding "multi-target links" fall well short of the specific features recited in claim 3, in which the alias is an address of a server that translates the alias into an address of a server on which a copy of the sub-page is hosted. This use of an "alias server" as recited in claim 3 is not taught or suggested by the general statements made in column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 3, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

Still further, with respect to dependent claim 5, the Office Action incorrectly asserts that Figures 6 and 11 and column 10, lines 1-24, column 10, lines 48-50 and column 11, lines 43-54 of Bates describe the features of claim 5. Applicants respectfully disagree. Namely, Figures 6 and 11 of Bates describe a method in which each URL is actuated in sequence, in order to obtain a document at each URL, whereby there is no teaching or suggestion that a determination is made as to whether actuation of a first link has been successful on the basis of a predetermined criterion, and if the determination is that the actuation of the first link was not successful, to then perform actuation of another link. Rather, in Figures 6 and 11 of

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Bates, each URL is obtained in sequence, which is totally contrary to the features recited in claim 5, whereby the steps (a) and (b) are repeated until either all links have been actuated or actuation of a link according to the predetermined criterion was successful.

Column 10, lines 1-24 of Bates describes navigating a link routine by calling a plurality of subroutines based on a particular type of link activated by a user, whereby, once a link has been selected, decision blocks detect a specific link type and pass control to a dedicated handling routine. Column 10, lines 48-50 of Bates describes that other types of multi-target links may be supported in other implementations. Column 11, lines 43-54 of Bates describes a method which determines whether a document has been successfully retrieved, and if not, to determine whether additional URLs remain to be processed in the link. Thus, if a document has not been successfully retrieved, the method of Bates merely moves on to the next document to be retrieved, without trying to retrieve the unsuccessfully-retrieved document from a different URL.

On page 17 of the Office Action, in the Response to Arguments section, its asserts that Applicant was arguing unclaimed limitations. However, the features in which a determination is made as to whether actuation of a first link has been successful on the basis of a predetermined criterion, and if the determination is that the actuation of the first link was not successful, to then perform actuation of another link, is not taught or suggested by Bates.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 5, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 7, that claim recites that the predetermined criterion is whether, within a predetermined period of time, a predetermined step in a process of establishing connection with a server has been reached. This "server connection time-out" feature is asserted in the Office Action to be described in column 14, lines 8-15 of Bates; Applicants respectfully disagree. Namely, column 14, lines 8-15 of Bates merely describes that a chronological link routine that uses chronological criteria that define when in time a particular document should be retrieved in response to selection of the link, whereby the time may correspond to a particular time of day, or when a particular document was updated. This disclosure in Bates has nothing at all to do with determining whether a connection has been established with a server within a predetermined period of time, as recited in claim 5. Rather,

it deals with a time sequence for obtaining document information from various links, without any description of establishment of link connections within a predetermine time period.

In the Response to Arguments section on pages 17 and 18 of the Office Action, it also refers to the "call ping time" as disclosed in column 11, line 60 to column 12, line 55, as well as in Figures 7 and 8 of Bates, for allegedly teaching the features recited in claim 7. However, the ping thread of Bates merely is used to test various targets specified by a given hypertext document currently displayed by a user, whereby a URL is either kept on a list or removed from a list based on whether or not a document has been successfully retrieved. See column 12, lines 44-55 of Bates in particular. This portion of Bates has nothing at all to do with determining whether a connection with a server has been reached within a predetermined period of time.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 7, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

Still further, with respect to dependent claim 10, that claim recites that <u>the predetermined criterion is the greatest progress in establishing full connection with one of the servers after a specified interval of time following simultaneous actuation of all links</u>. The Office Action incorrectly asserts that column 6, lines 15-50 of Bates describes these features. Namely, column 6, lines 15-50 of Bates describes general features of a computer, and does not come close to describing the specific features of checking which of a plurality of fully-established links has the greatest progress, whereby all of the lower-progressed links are terminated (see those features in intervening claim 9).

In the Response to Arguments section on page 18 of the Office Action, it basically states that Bates discloses the features recited in claim 10 because of the indefinite language used in that claim. However, as discussed previously in the **"Objection to Claim 10"** section of the Remarks, claim 10 is not indefinite, and Bates certainly does not teach the specific features recited in claim 10.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 10, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 12, that claim recites that <u>a plurality of links are sent</u> <u>to the client with the first page, each pointing to a different predetermined address within the</u> <u>Internet, each predetermined address being an address of a further server hosting a copy of the</u> <u>sub-page, and the instructions are executable upon actuation of each link</u>. In its rejection of claim 12, the Office Action incorrectly asserts that column 23, lines 1-20 of Bates describes the features recited in that claim. Namely, column 23, lines 1-20 of Bates describes features of Figure 23, in which relative lengths of regions are sized to indicate the percentage of the targets for the multi-target link from which data has been previously accessed. Thus, in Figure 23 of Bates, about ¼ of the data has been previously accessed. There is not description in this portion of Bates as to a <u>plurality of links each pointing to a different</u> <u>predetermined address within the Internet, each predetermined address being an address of a</u> <u>further server hosting a copy of the sub-page</u>, as recited in claim 12. Rather, at best, only one link that is requested by a user is displayed in the display of Bates, whereby a work-in-progress icon 632 is provided on the display.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 12, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 13, which recites that <u>the alias is an address of a</u> <u>server adapted to translate the alias to an address of one of the further servers</u>, the Office Action incorrectly asserts that column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates describes these features. Rather, column 7, lines 25-35 of Bates merely describes that multi-target links are utilized to navigate one or more "targets" in response to input received from a user, whereby each target is identified by URL, filename, path, and/or other manner of addressing a document in a computer system. There is no description in this portion of Bates as to an alias being an address of a serer that is adapted to translate an address of one of further servers, as recited in claim 13.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 13, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 14, it recites similar features to those discussed above with respect to claim 5, whereby Bates does not teach or suggest such features.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 14, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 20, it recites similar features to those discussed above with respect to claim 10, whereby Bates does not teach or suggest such features.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 20, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

With respect to dependent claim 23, that claim recites <u>displaying, based on a random selection, which of the plurality of links is to be actuated when the link on the first web page is selected by a user at the client</u>. The Office Action incorrectly asserts that these features are shown in Figure 23 of Bates. Rather, Figure 23 of Bates shows a browser display in which a pull-down menu allows a user to edit a bookmark or add a bookmark, and whereby there is no description of a random selection of links to be actuated when a link on a first web page is selected by a user. Rather, in Bates, a user selects a bookmarked URL, and the browser goes to the selected URL, whereby there is no random selection of links in such a system of Bates.

The Response to Arguments section on page 20 of the Office Action also refers to column 22, line 10 to column 23, line 40 of Bates for allegedly teaching the features recited in claim 23, but this assertion is incorrect. Rather, column 22 of Bates describes a bookmark list with a pointer that can be disposed over a bookmark, and whereby a user can position the pointer over a desired URL and depress a mouse button. Column 23 of Bates describes that alternate manners of displaying relative percentage of targets visited can be used besides using the bars as shown in Figure 22 of Bates. It is clear that neither column 22 nor column 23 of Bates teaches or suggests the specific features recited in claim 23. In more detail, nothing concerning "<u>displaying based on random selection</u>" is taught or suggested in columns 22 and 23 of Bates.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 23, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record.

Finally, with respect to dependent claim 24, that claim recites features in which a second client is provided with a second alias for the address of the another server on which the copy of the sub-page is hosted, in which the second alias of the another server is the same as the alias of the server, and in which the address of the another server is different from the address of the server. The Office Action incorrectly asserts that Figure 6, column 5, lines 54-66, column 6, lines 15-50, column 7, lines 25-67, column 8, lines 61-67, and column 13, lines 5-41 of Bates describe these features. Namely, Bates describes the concept of a "multi-target link", which is not at all related to displaying different aliases for a same address for different clients.

Accordingly, since Bates does not teach or suggest the features recited in claim 24, and since Kolsky does not rectify the above-mentioned shortcomings of Bates, that claim is patentable over the cited art of record

Conclusion:

Since all of the issues raised in the Office Action have been addressed in this Amendment and Reply, Applicants believe that the present application is now in condition for allowance, and an early indication of allowance is respectfully requested.

Applicant believes that the present application is now in condition for allowance. Favorable reconsideration of the application as amended is respectfully requested.

The Examiner is invited to contact the undersigned by telephone if it is felt that a telephone interview would advance the prosecution of the present application.

Respectfully submitted,

Date _June 22, 2007_

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